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The problem-solving literature that arose in the 1960s and 1970s in 
the promising and exciting field of artificial intelligence has had a 
profound impact on Design Methodology. The introduction of these 
theories in Design Methodology, at the start of the 1970s, helped 
to systemize the models and methods of design existing then, and 
link them to models of problem solving in other fields. There were 
high hopes that the very nature of design could be captured in a 
description that was based upon considering design the solution to 
“ill-structured problems.” 
Although there have been many developments since then, 
the original work on problem solving and the nature of ill-structured 
problems, written by Herbert Simon, still looms large over the field 
of design methodology. The rational problem-solving paradigm, 
based on the conceptual framework that Simon introduced, is still a 
dominant paradigm in the field.1 Design models and methods have 
been developed within this paradigm; the conceptual framework 
of rational problem solving has become the normal “language” 
of thinking and talking about design. There also have been many 
critiques of Simon’s problem-solving approach and its applicabil-
ity to the field of design, and many of the original statements in 
the problem-solving theory that deal with design have since been 
qualified and refined. However, these critiques have not produced a 
fundamentally different alternative to the conceptual framework. 
In this piece, we will revisit the basic assumptions behind 
Simon’s approach to design, notably the central concept of “ill-
structured problem,” and introduce some ideas that could lead to 
an alternative conceptual framework for thinking about design prob-
lems. First, we will revisit the original work by Simon at considerable 
length, and unearth the assumptions that underlie the conceptual 
framework that Simon uses to describe ill-structured problems. 
Then we will deal with some more recent developments within the 
problem-solving framework, and discuss some of the critiques on 
the rational problem-solving approach to design—again concentrat-
ing on the central notion of ill-structured problems. We will use this 
critique to propose a fledgling framework of alternative concepts 
that could be used to augment our understanding of the nature of 
1 C.H. Dorst, Describing Design: A 
Comparison of Paradigms (thesis TUDelft, 
1997).
© 2006 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Design Issues:  Volume 22, Number 3  Summer 2006 5
“design problems.” We will end with some further reflections and 
ideas for the development of an alternative framework for describ-
ing design. 
The Core of Simon’s Theory
In describing the core of Simon’s conceptual framework, we first will 
concentrate on his classic 1973 paper: “The Structure of Ill-structured 
Problems.” Unless otherwise stated, all quotes used in this section 
are taken from that paper. Of course, the conceptual framework 
that an author uses can be read from any paper, but this paper is 
especially suited because it is nicely explicit in its application to the 
field of design—although still broader in its orientation. The most 
important conclusions have been checked with other (later) papers 
by Simon. 
Within Simon’s theory, the issue of the solution of design 
problems takes the stage as an example of a wider category of 
problems—what he terms “ill-structured problems.” In his paper, 
Simon sets out to explore the relation between ill-structured prob-
lems and “well-structured problems.” He starts with the remark that 
many kinds of problems that often are treated as well-structured 
probably should be regarded as ill-structured. Even the limited 
problems (“limited” in the sense of taking place in an enclosed and 
well-defined world) that are used as standard examples in problem 
solving and AI literature, such as in playing chess, display elements 
of ill-structuredness on closer scrutiny: 
Even if we regard chess playing as a well-structured prob-
lem in the small, by most criteria it must be regarded as an 
ill-structured problem in the large (over the course of the 
game).
The stated goal of his paper is to show that there is no real boundary 
between well-structured problems and ill-structured problems, and 
therefore no reason to assume that the solution of ill-structured prob-
lems would require new and hitherto unknown types of problem-
solving processes. To start the comparison, Simon lists the following 
properties of well-structured problems:
        1 There is a definite criterion for testing any proposed solu-
tion, and a mechanical process for applying the criterion.
        2 There is at least one problem space in which it can be 
represented as the initial problem state, the goal state, and 
all other states that may be reached, or considered, in the 
course of attempting a solution to the problem.
        3 Attainable state changes (legal moves) can be represented 
in a problem space, as transitions from given states to 
the states directly attainable from them. But considerable 
moves, whether legal or not, also can be represented—that 
is, all transitions from one considerable state to another.
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        4 Any knowledge that the problem solver can acquire about 
the problem can be represented in one or more problem 
spaces.
        5 If the actual problem involves acting upon the external 
world, then the definition of state-changes and of the 
effect upon the state of applying any operator reflect with 
complete accuracy in one or more problem spaces the laws 
(laws of nature) that govern the external world.
        6 All of these conditions hold in the strong sense that the 
basic processes postulated require only practicable amounts 
of computation, and the information postulated is effec-
tively available to the processes—i.e., available with the 
help of only practicable amounts of search.
In the cases where all these rules apply, they allow such a well-
structured problem to be solved by a “general problem solver,” a 
computer program that follows preset rules to arrive at a solution. 
Simon later adds an extra criterion that further limits the actions that 
are allowed within the problem-solving process: 
What some notions of well-structuredness require, 
however, is that these capabilities be defined in advance, 
and that we do not allow the problem solver to introduce 
new resources that “occur” to him in the course of his solu-
tion efforts. If this condition is imposed, a problem that 
admits restructuring through the introduction of such new 
resources would be an ill-structured problem. A problem 
that is not solvable with reasonable amount of computation 
when all knowledge must be expressed in terms of the orig-
inal problem space may be easily solvable if the problem 
solver is allowed to use knowledge in another space.
 
Two important points can be picked up from these definitions. 
Apparently, if the problem-solving effort involves learning, or the 
redefinition of the problem, the problem cannot be considered well-
structured. And there is a methodological point to be made: appar-
ently, if we take item six in the definition of well-structured problems 
seriously, the ill-structuredness of a problem depends on the solution 
methods that are available to solve it. This opens up the way for 
suspecting that the ill-structuredness of a problem may not be an a 
priori property of the problem itself, but is linked to the capabilities 
of the problem solver. In this way, the subject that does the problem 
solving actually influences the very nature of the problem. Simon 
goes on to explain that: 
In general, the problems presented to problem solvers by 
the world are best regarded as ill-structured problems.
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Nevertheless, Simon maintains that the problem-solving theory that 
is based upon the solution of well-structured problems should serve 
as the basis for all problem solving. He has been criticized for this 
standpoint, and later concedes that:
... there is merit to the claim that much problem-solving 
effort is directed at structuring problems, and only a frac-
tion of it at solving problems once they are structured.
There is a basic assumption here that even though well-structured 
problems as such do not exist in the real world, the construction of 
well-structured problems from ill-structured problems is the way to 
solve an ill-structured problem. Simon then illustrates the solving 
of ill-structured problems by taking an example from design. The 
example involves designing a house, and concentrates on the tech-
nical problem of designing the layout of the house. In this case, the 
structuring actions that turn the ill-structured design problem into 
a well-structured problem are done by the architect: 
Additional specification will be obtained from the dialogue 
between architect and client, but the totality of that 
dialogue will still leave the design goals quite incompletely 
specified. The more distinguished the architect, the less 
expectation that the client should provide the constraints.
This is quite plausible, but Simon ignores the other conclusion one 
could draw from this example: namely, that even in the case of such 
a technical problem, with clear variables that allow for technical 
reasoning, and with the involvement of only one stakeholder, even 
here subjectivity creeps into the problem-solving process by the 
actions needed to construct a solvable problem. This means that, 
for the problem-solving theory to hold up as a good basis for the 
description of design, we now also need a detailed description of the 
problem solver, including an account of the earlier knowledge that 
the problem solver potentially brings to bear on this situation. One 
could even conclude that an ill-structured problem can’t be modeled 
without taking these properties of the problem solver into account. 
The interpretation of the problem is important, even in the simple 
example that Simon describes. Interpretation becomes even more 
important when we see that design is a process of multiple steps, 
not a one-off decision making situation. New interpretations will 
be based upon the interpretation that has been taking place in the 
earlier steps of the problem-solving process: 
As a matter of fact, the whole procedure could be organized 
as a system of productions, in which the elements already 
invoked from memory and the aspects of the design situa-
tion already arrived at up to any given point, would serve 
as the stimuli to evoke the next set of elements.
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This means that in a multistep problem-solving process, each prob-
lem solver will get the chance to pile interpretation upon interpre-
tation, and thus end up taking the problem-solving processes in 
completely different directions. Therefore, the use of memory and 
subjective interpretation becomes a major influence on the problem-
solving behavior of designers. If we take this seriously, then it under-
mines the very idea of having one, knowable problem at the start of 
the problem-solving process. But Simon misses this point:
... the architect will find himself working on a problem 
which, perhaps beginning in an ill-structured state, soon 
converts itself through evocation from memory into a well-
structured problem.
This statement is not supported by the data provided by Simon in 
his own example. It is, in fact, a restatement of the assumption that 
only well-structured problems can be solved. This is one of the major 
points where the applicability of Simon’s problem-solving theory 
to design has been questioned. It is important to note that, even if 
we were to agree with Simon that design problem solving would be 
based on the “normal” solution of well-structured problems, then 
this step of conversion becomes a major part of the problem-solving 
activity. This should be specified for the problem-solving theory to 
be complete. Simon later partially agreed to this by introducing an 
unspecified “noticing- and-evoking mechanism,” speaking about the 
need for an “indexed memory,” and placing the design process in an 
“effective problem space”:
... the effective problem space will undergo continuing 
change throughout the course of the game (author’s note:
problem-solving activity,), moving from one subspace to 
another of the large space defined by the contents of the 
long-term memory.
 
Here again, the course of the problem-solving process and the very 
structure of the ill-structured problem are determined by the possi-
bilities for action that the problem solver considers. These possibili-
ties for action are closely linked to the interpretation of the problem 
and the content of the acting subject’s memory. 
Simon concludes his paper: 
... the boundary between well-structured and ill-structured 
problem solving is indeed a vague and fluid boundary. 
There appears to be no reason to suppose that concepts as 
yet uninvented and unknown stand between us and the 
fuller exploration of those domains that are most obvi-
ously and visibly ill-structured. It suggests that there may 
be nothing other than the size of the knowledge base to 
distinguish ill-structured problems from well-structured 
problems, and that general problem-solving mechanisms 
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that have shown themselves to be efficacious for handling 
large, albeit apparently well-structured domains should be 
extendable to ill-structured domains without any need for 
introducing qualitatively new components.
This conclusion is not supported by the data, and contains a logical 
weakness: the fact that it is hard to draw a line that distinguishes 
between well-structured problems and ill-structured problems 
doesn’t mean that there is no difference. There may be elements 
within the process of solving ill-structured problems that can actu-
ally be more or less straightforward steps (that can be considered 
well-structured problems), but that doesn’t mean that the solving 
of ill-structured problems can be reduced to these straightforward 
steps. There is no evidence to support the claim that both kinds 
of problem solving are the same. The problem here is that Simon 
models well-structured problems and ill-structured problems in the 
same way. He never escapes from the circularity in his argument, 
and shoves aside the obvious differences between well-structured 
problems and ill-structured problems.
Later Developments
The rational problem-solving paradigm has become a powerful tool 
for the modeling of design, inspiring and permeating a large part of 
design methodology. However, the fundamental weaknesses in the 
conceptual framework that were unearthed in the last section also 
can be recognized in these later developments of the problem-solv-
ing approach to designing. The main thesis in this paper will be that 
these weaknesses are such an integral part of the problem-solving 
inheritance that they cannot easily be solved from within the ratio-
nal problem-solving paradigm. Two examples might illustrate this 
point.
In the substantial body of work on the “Function-Behavior-
Structure” model of design that has been developed by the research 
group at the Key Centre for Design Computing and Cognition, under 
the supervision of John Gero, we can find several echoes of the same 
difficulties. For instance, the FBS model ascribes an equally large 
role to the use of “design prototypes” in determining the “framing” 
of the design problem, as Simon does to the “memory” and “expe-
rience” that a problem solver needs to transform an ill-structured 
problem into a well-structured one. This large role for “experience” 
and “prototypes” leads to grave methodological difficulties. Because 
of the very open-ended way in which the use of “design prototypes” 
is described in the FBS model, they potentially make up a vital part 
of the design process, actually bypassing the design process that is 
modeled in the core FBS model.2 The neat and clear design process 
model looses most of its value if it is preceded by a very messy and 
overwhelmingly influential step called “the adoption of a proto-
type.”
2 C.H. Dorst and P.E. Vermaas, “John Gero’s 
Function-Behavior-Structure Model of 
Designing: A Critical Analysis” Research 
in Engineering Design 16 (2005): 17–26.
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In a recent paper, Dorst and Cross3 have tried to find a way 
to arrive at a closer description of problem solving of ill-structured 
problems by using an empirical study to analyze and describe the 
design process as a “coevolution” of the design problem and the 
design solution. This coevolution model of design is based on the 
work by Maher et al.4 
Based on their empirical study, they observe that the creation 
of solutions to ill-structured design problems seems to be a very 
gradual process—an evolution. Their analysis shows that creative 
design is not a matter of first fixing the problem (through objec-
tive analysis or the imposition of a frame) and then searching for 
a satisfactory solution concept. Creative design seems more to be a 
matter of developing and refining together both the formulation of a 
problem and ideas for a solution, with constant iteration of analysis, 
synthesis, and evaluation processes between the two notional design 
“spaces”—problem space and solution space. In creative design, the 
designer is seeking to generate a matching problem-solution pair, 
through a coevolution of the problem and the solution. Creative 
design involves a period of exploration in which problem and solu-
tion spaces are evolving, and are unstable until (temporarily) fixed 
by an emergent bridge, which identifies a problem-solution pairing. 
The description of design as the coevolution of problem and solution 
leads to the uneasy conclusion that, in describing design, we cannot 
presuppose that there is something like a set “design problem” at 
any point in the design process. 
This leads to some very pertinent methodological questions. 
Can we still describe design in terms of problem-solving theories 
if we have to abandon the idea that the “design problem” can be 
identified at all? What then is the meaning of saying that design is a 
process running from “a problem” to “a solution”? We can probably 
stick to the problem-solving theory of design only if we abandon 
the idea that there is a definable problem at the start of the design 
process, and postulate that it will be constructed later on. This then 
begs the question how this problem is constructed, and whether 
this process of “problem construction” can be modeled at all. Also, 
if this process of problem construction could be modeled, whether 
that modeling should be done within the rational problem-solving 
paradigm, or outside of it.
In the next sections, we will introduce two different 
approaches that already have been taken to tackle this problem. 
First, we will consider the work of Dreyfus and Suchman, model-
ing design problems as situated problems; and then we will look at 
Hatchuel’s ideas on “extended rationality.” Finally, we will use this 
critique to present an idea for a fledgling model of design problems 
based on a radically different set of concepts. 
3 C.H. Dorst and N.G. Cross, “Creativity 
in the Design Process: Co-evolution of 
Problem-solution,” Design Studies 22 
(2001): 425–37.
4 M.L. Maher, J. Poon, and S. Boulanger, 
“Formalizing Design Exploration as Co-
evolution: A Combined Gene Approach” 
in Advances in Formal Design Methods 
for CAD, J.S. Gero and F. Sudweeks, eds. 
(London: Chapman and Hall, 1996).
Design Issues:  Volume 22, Number 3  Summer 2006 11
New Approaches
The “rational problem-solving paradigm” developed in the 1960s 
and ‘70s largely was inspired by developments in AI and the cogni-
tive sciences. The epic endeavor to build intelligent computer 
systems focused on the ability of such a system to solve ill-structured 
problems within an open context—somewhat comparable to design-
ing. These systems, based on a rational problem-solving approach, 
represented the “relevant aspects” of the world, and set up formal 
procedures to manipulate these representations in order to solve a 
problem. This approach has failed.5 Alternative approaches were 
developed based on situating problem-solving activity.6, 7, 8 We will 
now explore whether considering design as situated problem solv-
ing will help us get closer to developing an alternative description 
of design problem solving. 
Situated Problem Solving
The description of design as a situated activity involves two impor-
tant shifts in standpoint. The first consideration in situated prob-
lem solving is the design problem as seen through the eyes of the 
designer, in the design situation. This means that we concentrate 
on the “local” design problem that a designer faces, and ignore the 
“overall” design problem as something of an abstraction. We also 
have to deal with the vagueness (i.e., lack of overview) and subjec-
tivity inherent in local design actions and decisions. Seen from this 
perspective, “the design problem” as such does not really exist as 
an objective entity in the world. It is an amalgamation of different 
problems centered on the basic challenge described in a design brief. 
This amalgamation of problems discovered by the designer in the 
design process is partially created by the designer. The process of 
“approaching a design problem” or “dealing with a problematic 
situation” is a vital clue to understanding what design problems 
are. The second fundamental shift in standpoint is that, for much 
of the design project, the problem-solving steps can be quite logi-
cal, routine, and implicit; without any real choice by the designer. 
Dreyfus holds that problematic situations are the result of a “break-
down” in this normal, fluent problem-solving behavior. (The prob-
lem becomes “at hand,” in Heidegger’s terms.) These “breakdowns” 
are then the moments of real choice. It thus becomes very important 
to distinguish and describe the nature of these breakdowns—the 
critical situations in design.9 These breakdowns are the points that 
Schön, in his work on reflective practice, describes as “surprises.”10 
Schön describes them as the turning points in the designer’s reflec-
tive conversation with the situation. Please note that the definition of 
a “design problem” has been narrowed, and limited to the situations 
where routine problem solving has failed. 
If we can be convinced by Dreyfus and others that there is 
never a (complete) representation of the design problem in the head 
of the designer, then the only thing left for us to study is the “local” 
5 H.L. Dreyfus, “Intelligence without 
Representation: Merleau-Ponty’s 
Critique of Mental Representation,” 
Phenomenology and the Cognitive 
Sciences 1 (2002): 367–383.
6 F.J. Varela, E. Thompson, and E. Rosch, 
The Embodied Mind (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1991).
7 T. Winograd and F. Flores, Understanding 
Computers and Cognition (Norwood, NJ: 
Ablex Publishing, 1986).
8 L.A. Suchman, Plans and Situated Actions 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987). 
9 E. Frankenberger and P. Badke-Schaub, 
“Modeling Design Processes in Industry: 
Empirical Investigations of Design Work 
in Practice” in Proceedings of DMD’96, O. 
Akin et al., eds. (Istanbul, 1996).
10 D.A. Schön, The Reflective Practitioner 
(New York: Basic Books, 1983).
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network of links that a designer considers while tackling a design 
problem in the design situation. The incompleteness and subjective 
nature of this local network of problems means that we need a model 
of how designers approach a problematic situation. 
Problem Solving and Design
Hatchuel11 analyzes the work of Simon on design in its original 
context, as part of Simon’s bigger project on the development of a 
theory about “bounded rationality.” The aim of this project was to 
“explain human behavior by simple and constrained, yet informed, 
decision rules.” The bounded-rationality project spans Simon’s 
work in economics, artificial intelligence, and design. This lifelong 
background project can help us understand what Simon is trying to 
achieve in his writings on design. It also explains the strong empha-
sis that Simon placed on the solid ground provided by well-struc-
tured problems, and the rules for solving them, that we have seen in 
the section describing the core of Simon’s theory.
For Simon, creativity and discovery in science, art, and design 
were all potentially describable within the bounded rationality 
perspective. In developing this perspective, Simon sees a strong 
theory of design as crucial. The possibility to develop a strong 
theory on design (the archetypal “science of the artificial”) within 
this general framework of bounded rationality serves as a litmus 
test for the bigger project itself. Simon’s drive to achieve this leads 
to poetic statements:
The proper study of mankind is said to be man ... If I have 
made my case, then we can conclude that, in larger part, the 
proper study of mankind is the science of design, not only 
as the professional component of a technical education but 
as a core discipline for every liberally educated person.12
Hatchuel argues that Simon is overeager in his efforts to incorpo-
rate design within the general bounded-rationality problem-solving 
theory. Hatchuel illustrates the distinction that he thinks needs to be 
made between design and problem solving by an example in which 
two problem situations are compared. He pictures a group of friends 
coming together on a Saturday night. The one problem situation is 
that they are “looking for a good movie in town”; the other problem 
situation is that they set out to “have a party.” The first situation is 
considered to be “problem solving,” while the second situation is, 
in Hatchuel’s terms, a real design project. Hatchuel argues that there 
are three important differences between these situations: 
      A.  The first difference is that the design situation includes the 
(unexpected) expansion of the initial concepts in which 
the situation is initially framed (“a party”). This makes the 
solution process a “project” instead of a “problem.” There is 
no dominant design for what a party should be, so imagina-
tion needs to be applied at this very fundamental level.
11 A. Hatchuel, “Towards Design Theory and 
Expandable Rationality: The Unfinished 
Program of Herbert Simon,” Journal of 
Management and Governance 5:3–4 
(2002).
12 H.A. Simon, Sciences of the Artificial 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1992), 
159.
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       B. A second difference is that the design situation requires 
the design and use of “learning devices” in order to get to 
a solution. These “learning devices” are sub-processes that 
help us “learn about what has to be learned or should be 
learned.” They include experiments and simulation tech-
niques.
      C.  Finally, in designing, the understanding and designing of 
the social interactions is part of the design process itself. 
The group of friends needs to develop a way of reaching a 
solution that cannot be supposed to exist before the design 
situation arises. This point comes very close to the work of 
Louis Bucciarelli, who claims that: “Design is fundamentally 
a social process.”13 
 
From this comparison, we can conclude that design undoubt-
edly includes stretches of ill-structured problem solving, but that it 
also contains other processes. For Hatchuel, design includes prob-
lem solving, but it cannot be reduced to problem solving. He states 
that any model or description method that tries to reduce design to 
problem solving is bound to miss important aspects of the design 
activity. This observation ties together our earlier conclusions, and 
the remarks made on the modeling of design as coevolution and 
situating design problem-solving activities. 
All of this means that the very notion of “design problem” 
becomes extremely problematic. If the “design problem” in general 
is not knowable at any specific point in the design process;14 and 
if it is evolving in the design process—at least until the creation 
of the design concept, and possibly beyond that point;15 and if the 
connotations of the very concepts that are used to describe a “design 
problem” are shifting as a part of the design effort;16 then we need 
to radically reconsider our use of the term “design problem.” The 
fundamental question that now presents itself is: What is the real 
meaning the term “design problem,” and how we can use it in 
design methodology? 
To explore this, we will use a philosophical technique called 
“bracketing” that was pioneered by the phenomenologist Husserl 
in the early years of the twentieth century. In bracketing, we first 
establish that the notion of design problem, though deceptively 
simple, is just too complex and complicated to be useful in studying 
design. We have tried to show in this paper that the notion of design 
problem is so riddled with difficulties that it actually is obscuring 
our vision of the phenomenon that it tries to cover. So we propose 
to “bracket” the notion of design problem, meaning that we are 
temporarily going to describe the underlying phenomenon without 
using the term itself. Once we have this description and analysis 
of the underlying phenomenon, the bracketed word can be reintro-
13 L.L. Bucciarelli, Designing Engineers 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994).
14 H.L. Dreyfus, “Intelligence without 
Representation— Merleau-Ponty’s 
Critique of Mental Representation,” 
Phenomenology and the Cognitive 
Sciences 1 (2002): 367–383.
15 C.H. Dorst and N.G. Cross, “Creativity 
in the Design Process: Co-evolution of 
Problem-solution,” Design Studies 22 
(2001): 425–37.
16 A. Hatchuel, “Towards Design Theory and 
Expandable Rationality: The Unfinished 
Program of Herbert Simon,” Journal of 
Management and Governance 5:3–4 
(2002).
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duced, in a way that it is better connected to the other terms that are 
used to describe the phenomenon within the nomological network. 
This latter step is important: if the bracketed word is widely used 
in vernacular descriptions of the subject (as surely is the case for 
“design problem”), then it would be foolish to ignore that use.
Paradoxes and the Modeling of Design as a Discursive Activity
In this section, we will attempt to create a new description of the 
design situation without using “design problem,” while accom-
modating some of the difficulties that we have encountered in our 
analysis of the use of the term within the rational problem-solving 
paradigm. Setting up of an alternative conceptual framework is an 
open-ended problem in itself: design can be described in numerous 
ways. For reasons that go beyond the scope of this paper, we have 
chosen to develop a fledgling theory of design centered on “para-
dox” and “discourse.” The reader should take the description of 
design that is presented in this subsection as one example of many 
possible ways to describe the same phenomenon. We hope to inspire 
the reader to develop additional ways. 
The use of the term “paradox” is inspired by the work of 
Caroline Whitbeck. In her book Ethics in Engineering Practice and 
Research, she remarks: 
... The initial assumption [author’s note: within moral 
philosophy] that a conflict is irresolvable is misguided, 
because it defeats any attempt to do what design engineers 
often do so well, namely, to satisfy potentially conflicting 
considerations simultaneously.17
This description of paradoxical situations defines the nature of the 
problematic relationship that designers and engineers are dealing 
with through their design thinking.18 “Paradox” is used here in the 
sense of a complex statement that consists of two or more conflicting 
statements. In the initial state of the paradoxical problem situation, 
all the statements that make up the paradox are true or valid, but 
they cannot be combined. A paradox, a real opposition of views, 
standpoints, or requirements, thus requires a redefinition of the 
problematic situation in order to create a solution. An example 
from product design would be that a certain product, that cannot be 
moved, needs to be there to perform its function at one moment in 
time, and it needs to be invisible and not take up space at another 
moment in time. The creation of solutions to a paradoxical design 
situation often requires the development and creative redefinition 
of that situation. 
The elementary statements that make up the paradox, and 
the viewpoints and ways of thinking that underlie these state-
ments, will now be described in terms of “discourses.” The term 
“discourse” was introduced by the philosopher Michel Foucault, 
most extensively in his book The Archaeology of Knowledge.19 He uses 
17 C. Whitbeck, Ethics in Engineering 
Practice and Research (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998).
18 This situation of being hampered in 
the normal, routine problem-solving 
activity has been described in terms of 
“surprises” (Schön, 1983), or “critical 
situations” (Frankenberger, 1996). 
19 M. Foucault, The Archeology of 
Knowledge (London: Routledge, 1969, 
1989).
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this term to describe the complete structure of terms and relation-
ships that lie at the basis of the thinking and discussions within 
an area of human activity. These terms and relationships can, for 
instance, be captured in textbooks and in well-known examples of 
“the normal way of working.” Because the terms and relationships 
within a discourse make up the very elements of human thought, 
the discourse in a field spans the complete breadth of human thinking 
within that domain. “Discourse” can be loosely compared to Kuhn’s 
use of “paradigms,”20 but Foucault doesn’t support Kuhn’s idea of 
the wholesale “revolutions” as the origin of these discourses. In his 
own work, Foucault traces the changes in the meaning and use of 
key concepts within a domain, rather than looking for revolutions.
In most design disciplines, there are many discourses that 
somehow have to be linked in the creation of a design solution. In 
product design practice, for example, relevant discourses include the 
bodies of thought about technology, form an aesthetics, ergonomics, 
etc. These are called the “aspects” of a design.21 Discourses also can 
be embodied in a design situation by the roles and the value systems 
of the different stakeholders involved in the project. The creation of 
a solution to the paradoxical design situation thus also becomes a 
social process. 
The designer, in his/her paradoxical problematic situa-
tion, needs to construct a design that transcends or connects the 
different discourses, in a general sense (by the construction of a 
meta-discourse), or just in the concrete instance of the design-to-be-
developed. To do this, the designer has to step out of the ways of 
thinking embodied in the discourses. This step is likely to include 
a strong intuitive element. Based upon a clear understanding of the 
discourses, and upon earlier experiences with paradoxical situations, 
a solution is created that needs to be evaluated from the standpoints 
of all the different discourses (i.e., to see that the solution is valuable 
within the relevant discourses). Designers use their understanding 
of the ways of thinking within the different discourses to create a 
framework in which a solution is possible for the paradoxical situ-
ation. The paradoxical problem situation works as both a trigger 
to creative imagination and as a context for the evaluation of the 
design. For the solution to be a solution, it needs to be recognized as 
such in the contexts of all the relevant discourses. (In practice, this 
often means, first and foremost, that it should be acceptable to all 
the relevant stakeholders.)
Discussion
In this last section, we have constructed a model of design in which 
the nature of “design problems” is further specified. A “design prob-
lem” is taken as a paradox, made up out of the clash of conflicting 
discourses. The nature of creative design is the forging of connec-
tions between these discourses, on a general level or in the concrete 
design. It should be stressed that this is just a fledgling theory, meant 
20 T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1962, 1969).
21 C.H. Dorst, Describing Design: A 
Comparison of Paradigms (thesis TUDelft, 
1997).
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to solve some methodological problems, but undoubtedly creating 
new ones. At least it does shed some new light upon the three main 
problems with the use of the term “design problems” in design 
methodology identified earlier:
       1. The “design problem” is not knowable at any specific point in the 
design process.22 With the adoption of the design situation as 
the unit of description, the question of defining the design 
problem as a whole becomes irrelevant. The paradox that 
drives the design process within a problematic situation, 
at a certain moment in the design process, should be deter-
mined from the designers’ actions and words. The next task 
we then encounter in the quest to really understand design 
is, of course, to define the structure of the discourses. This 
could be difficult, although Foucault has developed some 
basic methodologies for this in his original work on the 
history of the discourse on mental illness. 
       2. The “design problem” is hard to identify because it evolves in the 
design process.23 This is partly covered above. We could add 
that the discourses hardly evolve within a design project, 
but that paradoxes (the point at which the discourses clash, 
and the way in which they do) may evolve throughout the 
design project.
       3. The connotations of the very concepts that are used to describe a 
“design problem” are shifting as a part of the design effort.24 The 
central notions that make up the paradoxes the designers 
are dealing with indeed are meant to shift in the course of 
creating a solution. A clear view of the original discourses 
that play a part in the design project will provide an 
anchoring point for understanding these shifts. 
This model needs to be extended much further, for instance by 
defining the link between the notion of discourses and the aspects 
of a design, the stakeholders involved in a design project, and the 
designer’s level of expertise. But we must leave this here for now.
Concluding Remarks
We hope to have effectively argued that the conceptual framework 
that underlies much of design methodology, while perhaps not 
flawed, is full of assumptions that may be questioned. Some of the 
problems inherent in Simon’s theory are inherited by people using 
the conceptual framework that he introduced. Our argument has 
focused on the term “design problem.” The widespread use of this 
term in the vernacular discussions within and about design make 
it one of the basic terms in a methodological description of design 
activities. But we hope to have demonstrated that the term “design 
problem” is very problematic in a scientific context. In the scientific 
22 H.L. Dreyfus, “Intelligence without 
Representation— Merleau-Ponty’s 
Critique of Mental Representation,” 
Phenomenology and the Cognitive 
Sciences 1 (2002): 367–383.
23 C.H. Dorst and N.G. Cross, “Creativity 
in the Design Process: Co-evolution of 
Problem-solution,” Design Studies 22 
(2001): 425–37.
24 A. Hatchuel, “Towards Design Theory and 
Expandable Rationality: The Unfinished 
Program of Herbert Simon,” Journal of 
Management and Governance 5:3–4 
(2002).
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study of design, we cannot say that the design activity consists 
of reasoning from “a design problem” to “a solution”—at least it 
becomes meaningless to say so if we cannot define the notion of 
“design problem” or pin it down in empirical descriptions of design 
activity. 
Temporarily bracketing the term “design problem” allows 
new frames of reference and descriptions of the design activity to 
emerge. Within this paper, that process has resulted is an alterna-
tive way to describe the design as the resolution of paradoxes between 
discourses in a design situation. This alternative way of describing 
design potentially sheds new light on the nature of design, and on 
the kind of creativity that is part and parcel of design. The next step 
would be to confront this new description of design with the exist-
ing models and methods within design methodology, and see if this 
produces interesting insights into the nature of design. 
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